New Jersey Institute of Technology

Digital Commons @ NJIT
Computerized Conferencing and Communications
Center Reports

Special Collections

8-1-1978

A discussion of selected aspects of privacy,
confidentiality, and anonymity in computerized
conferencing
Computerized Conferencing & Communications Center
Robert Bezilla

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/ccccreports
Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons
Recommended Citation
Computerized Conferencing & Communications Center and Bezilla, Robert, "A discussion of selected aspects of privacy,
confidentiality, and anonymity in computerized conferencing" (1978). Computerized Conferencing and Communications Center Reports.
10.
https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/ccccreports/10

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections at Digital Commons @ NJIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Computerized Conferencing and Communications Center Reports by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ NJIT. For more
information, please contact digitalcommons@njit.edu.

COMPUTERIZED CONFERENCING
& COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
at
NEW JERSEY
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

A Discussion of Selected Aspects of
Privacy, Confidentiality, and Anonymity
in Computerized Conferencing
by
Robert Bezilla
August 1978
Research Report Number Eleven
Computerized Conferencing and Communications Center

c/o Computer & Information Science Department
New Jersey Institute of Technology
323 High Street, Newark, N. J. 07102

A Discussion of Selected Aspects of
Privacy, Confidentiality, and Anonymity
in Computerized Conferencing
by
Robert Bezilla
August 1978
Research Report Number Eleven
Computerized Conferencing and Communications Center
New Jersey Institue of Technology
323 High St.
Newark, N.J. 07102

Robert Bezilla is Executive Vice President of
Benson & Benson, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey.
He is an Associate of the Computerized Conferencing
and Communications Center at the New Jersey
Institute of Technology.

Copyright 0 1978 by Robert Bezilla

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
I

Background

II Social Science and Survey Research Applications .

Page

iii
iv
1
9

III Applications In Computerized Conferencing . . . . 17
Notebooks

19

Messaging

20

Conferencing

20

Bulletin

21

Microprocessor

21

Modeling and Simulation

22

Directory

23

Collections

25

Pseudonyms and Masks

27

IV Barriers

30

Time Coincidence

31

Traffic Analysis

31

Participation

31

Response Time

31

Editing Sophistication

32

Writing Characteristics

32

Terminal Characteristics

32

Subjective Style

33

Boasting

33

Compromise

33

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

V

Decoder Silence

34

Security

35

Confidentiality Protocol

36

Anonymity Abuses

38

Interfacing Compromises

39

Monitoring Abuses

40

Suggested Enhancements

41

Security

41

Member Rights

42

Thwarting Inadvertent Disclosure

44

Preventing Misappropriation of Pen Name

44

Minimizing Misapplication of Pen Names

45

Member Item Deletion Control

46

Member Reception Control

47

Confirmation

49

Interfacing Conventions

50

Expediency vs. Participation

51

VI Conclusions

55

APPENDIX A: Nomenclature

57

APPENDIX B: EIES Policy Statement (by Murray Turoff)

61

APPENDIX C: Discussion of Copying of Private Messages

65

APPENDIX D: Identities and Role Definitions in
Computerized Conferencing (by Elaine Kerr) 72
Notes

85

BIBLIOGRAPHY: Referenced Sources

88

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Later in this report there is a discussion of the manner
in which computerized conferencing can be employed to
provide proper attribution to individuals for group
enterprises. Unfortunately, such techniques are still in
development and so I must rely upon more conventional means
to acknowledge the considerable assistance I have received.
Elaine Kerr, not only cajoled me into exploring and
utilizing computerized conferencing in greater depth, but
provided invaluable, substantive editorial guidance for
this report.
Murray Turoff, Roxanne Hiltz, Barry Wellman, Charlton
Price, and Jim Williams were unending sources of ideas,
suggestions and encouragement.
And there have been many others, including some, who to
my great glee, could be identified only through "anonymous"
or pen name designations.
I have been privileged to have learned much from these
people, but I must bear the responsibility for whatever
syntheses and interpretations I have derived from our
discussions, and most especially, I must acknowledge that
some of my thoughts have been presented in contradiction
of what probably was very good advice.

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents a discussion of the potential uses
of privacy, confidentiality and anonymity in computerized
conferencing.
Section I begins with definitions of the concepts, their
aspects and allied terms; and briefly discusses their use in
general communications and problem-solving activities.
Section II explores their use in social research,
particularly the survey method, a field that may yield useful
analogues for computerized conferencing.
Section III outlines the various functions of privacy,
confidentiality and anonymity that have been proposed for
their constructive use in computerized conferencing.
Section IV reports various difficulties and compromises
that have been encountered to date in striving to achieve
true privacy, confidentiality or anonymity in computerized
conferencing.
Section V gives preliminary estimates of various ways of
enhancing the concepts through computerized conferencing.
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SECTION I: Background

The inner thoughts of sentient beings are held in privacy
until such time as they may be shared with others. The
dissemination of private thoughts to others can be constrained
by conditions of confidentiality or anonymity.
In this report privacy is defined as the thoughts,
emotions and actions that an individual does not share with
others. Confidentiality constitutes the sharing of thoughts,
emotions or actions with another party, who may also be given
authority to share their content but not the identity of their
originator. Anonymity consists of sharing of thoughts,
emotions or actions, but with concealment or lack of
identification of their perpetrator. When the constraints
imposed by confidentiality or anonymity are removed, matters
are no longer considered to be private but to enter into the
*
public domain.
The surrendering of privacy can be said to be either
active or passive. Actively, a person may choose to divulge
private matters to another, either because that person needs
them for some purpose, or to meet some needs of their owner.
Passively, social organizations, ranging from dyads to
international organizations, may require knowledge of
private matters to promote the common welfare; that is, to

A fuller description of the principal terms, their origins,
and their current usage in computerized conferencing
nomenclature, appears in Appendix A.
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protect the rights of a group against the individual or to
guide the progress of the group through better knowledge.
Frequently, the surrender of one's rights to privacy may be
accompanied by stated or implicit guarantees of confidentiality
or anonymity.
At its most basic level the right of confidentiality has
been recognized historically in such one-on-one relationships
as physician-patient, attorney-client and priest-confesser.
Violation of these relationships is at the heart of the codes
of ethics of these followings and others, and societal
sanctions frequently exist against those who would violate
or in any way compromise the relationships. Compromise of the
privileges usually may be sanctioned only under the direst
circumstances, e.g., identification of the bearer of a
serious infectious disease. The rights of the individual vs.
society are less clear in cases such as the confession of a
criminal act. In such cases both a profession and the
society in which it functions may claim jurisdiction over
the determination of the disclosure of matters given in
confidence, and the affected person on occasion can be
expected to assert rights of privacy in litigation against
the professional or agency if compromises are made. Indeed,
the degree and manner of the determination of private rights
vs. societal rights can be an important distinguishing
attribute of societies, e.g., the "Bill of Rights" of the
United States vs. the "collective rights" of the People's
Republic of China.
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For most everyday societal activities, particularly those
related to finance and commerce, privileges of confidentiality
are extended rarely except in such sanctuaries as Swiss banks.
Consumers frequently are chagrined to discover that their
financial affairs, or even personal affairs, may be an open
book to tax collectors, creditors, insurers, potential
employers and others. In recent years computerized data banks
have created means through which much information can be
shared and interrelated quickly and efficiently by
inquisitive parties. Frequently legislation and regulations
do not appear so much to restrict the dissemination of

"confidential" files as to set limitations upon the compilation
of dossiers through data base interfacing, and, most
curiously, to assert the rights of citizens to examine what
is known or has been said about them. But even such basic
rights would appear to be compromised as disclosures of
interagency cooperation are made with disturbing frequency,
and as those who go to the trouble to examine files, are
dismayed to discover that information about themselves may
be withheld from their view on grounds of "security."
Historically, there has been little resistance shown
towards releasing aggregated or anecdotal data as long as
the individual is not cited as its source; i.e., that the
individual's confidentiality is preserved. The American
Statistical Association's Ad Hoc Committee on Privacy and
Confidentiality asserted recently (1977) that,
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"...of preeminent importance...is the need for
achieving a balance between a person's fundamental
right to privacy and society's need to acquire
information for identification and measurement of
its current dimensions and characteristics."
In other words, the aggregate or anecdotal experience of
the physician can be recognized as an essential ingredient of
diagnostic skill; the attorney's experience contributes to
the foundation of legal precedent; and accumulated
confidential confessions undoubtedly inspire innumerable
sermons. Consumers and their advocates are not likely to be
upset by a bank's marketing research that designates average
transaction size, by empirically-based actuarial tables, or
by census reports derived from aggregated income tax
compilations.
The confidential anecdote has been institutionalized as
the case history method in many professions, and the
aggregation of confidential data is cited as a prime
constituent of the nature of statistics by the Ad Hoc
Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality.
"The individual identification of a statistical
record and its contents is held confidential from
all except the persons collecting and compiling the
aggregated data. Au individual's record is not used
to determine any action that affects the individual
except through the contribution of the record to
statistical aggregates, averages, or measures of
relationships. The very essence of statistical
analysis is that the identity of individual units
of which it is composed is immaterial. Individuals
should not be identifiable in the output of a
statistical system."
The nature and constraints governing privacy and
confidentiality are at least partially understood by the
average citizen, and are tolerated or encouraged by all
-4-

governments. Only in the most extreme cases of political
imprisonment has their total suppression been attempted.
The rights of an entire people probably have never been
suppressed uniformly except in the writings on "thought
control" by science fiction and fantasy writers. Indeed,
Merton (1957) asserts that without opportunities for
privacy and confidentiality, the social structure itself
would be threatened,
"Otherwise, the pressure to live up to the details
of all (and often conflicting) social norms would
become literally unbearable...'Privacy' is not
merely a personal predilection; it is an important
functional requirement for the effective operation
of social structure. Social systems must provide
for some appropriate measure, as they say in France,
of quant-a-soi -- a portion of the self which is kept
immune from social surveillance."
The use of anonymous communication is less frequently
made and understood. Totalitarian governments may justifiably
regard an anonymous slogan painted on the wall or anonymous
pamphlet as a threat to their very existence. In more
democratic societies sanctions usually will be invoked
against anonymity only in cases of extreme deviant behavior,
e.g., threatening letters or obscene telephone calls. Until
recently the use of anonymous communication probably has
been confined largely to communications by the elite who for
various reasons chose to write letters to the editor
unsigned or signed with a pen name, authored books under a
nom de plume, or contributed to worthy causes as an
"anonymous donor" or "friend." Even governments will request
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the attribution of remarks to a "usually reliable source"
in the free press, or under a fictitious signature in a
state-controlled newspaper or journal. It may even be
questionable if many such communications are intended to be
truly anonymous: the cognoscenti may recognize an old friend
behind the pen name, only the very naive would believe that
a "citizen" would dare to write a stinging letter of rebuke
to a totalitarian state's captive press, and pathological
killers have been known to plead anonymously for someone
to "stop me before I kill again."
Among non-elites anonymous expression seldom appears to
have been available except under bizarre conditions such as
the suspension of conventions and physical masking during
fertility rites, e.g., modern Mardi Gras celebrations. More
recently, however, the introduction of citizen's band radio
has captured the popular imagination and the air waves are
filled with the fanciful "handles" employed by users to mask
their true identities [1]. Celebrities, however, seem to
take pains to disclose their CB pseudonyms so that the
ordinary citizen will know in reality "First Mama" is the
President's wife.
The structured use of anonymity is likely to be encountered
only in the work of the research scientist or practitioner.
In the social sciences, and particularly in the use of
survey research, conditions can exist in which it is
desirable to grant and ensure anonymity to research
participants who are reporting upon their behavior or ideas;
-6-

that is, upon conditions that normally could not be measured
accurately without full promise of anonymity. By use of
methodologies utilizing anonymous functions, the researcher
can promote:
1. Interaction for the free exchange of ideas or the
reporting of matters without any threat of disclosure
of the same to peers or even to the collectors or
compilers of the data; that is, anonymity can remove
any threat that the privacy of personal data will be
compromised.
2. Objectivity through the masking of identity can
serve to suppress distracting sensory cueing or
ad hominem fallacies so that the matter being
reported or discussed can be considered on its
intrinsic merits without regard to personal origins
or aspects of origin.
3. Problem solving for the total subordination of the
individual ego to the group task. Presumably
anonymity can be used to suppress individual
considerations that might hinder the group's progress
in a mission, e.g., one would not have to worry about
peer relations, advancement of unpopular ideas, risk
ridicule, etc.
Another form of anonymous function that may be emerging in
the physical sciences is that characterized by journalists'
pronouncements of the "anonymity" in "Big Science."
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Journalists, scientists, students of the social study of
science alike have noted for some time a growing trend in
the physical sciences that is directing scientific inquiry
away from the individual effort towards a necessary joint
effort [2]. This development has brought about an approachavoidance conflict in which scientists recognize an
absolute necessity for collaborative effort in certain
fields, but equally recognize secondary consequences which
make it difficult to reward equitably the contributions of
individuals to the group enterprise. The resolution of this
dilemma is far from clear, but a possible solution derived
from computerized conferencing will be discussed in Section

III.
As privacy, confidentiality and anonymity function in a
social setting, two further concepts, security and
censorship, should be defined for the purposes of this
report.
Security is employed in the sense of preserving cognitive
space or transmission in such a fashion that unauthorized
access cannot be gained casually or sureptitiously, or so
that any such attempt will at least be greatly impeded [3].
Censorship constitutes a denial of access to thoughts,
communications or information that could be maintained in
private, confidential, anonymous or public modes [4].
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SECTION II: Social Science and Survey Research Applications

Privacy per se is a condition that may be discussed and
described by the social scientist, but is of no functional
use in scholarship or professional practice because it
contradicts the basic scientific requirement to communicate
ideas freely with one's peers [5].
Confidentiality, however, is a condition that has long
been used by social scientists. In one-on-one relationships,
the case histories of individuals revealing their most
hidden thoughts, hidden perhaps even to themselves, has been
a major foundation of psychoanlytic theory [6]. The
confidence established through the client-social worker
relationship undoubtedly has established the empirical basis
for many social theories that have been derived from the
accumulation of multiple experiences. The use of aggregated
statistical data, usually collected with assurances of
confidentiality, is a hallmark of modern empirical social
science. The experimental subject's rights to confidentiality
are being spelled out in the codes of ethics of the social
science professions and in a set of interlocking federal
directives in such detail that many researchers are
beginning to worry that their ability to carry out projects
may be debilitated [7]. Indeed, even the term "subject" is
now seen by many as dehumanizing and as a threat to
people's rights. Merton suggests there is an ambivalency in
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the need to provide privacy to individuals and to provide
also insights to human behavior to social scientists.
...the social scientist is so often an object of
ambivalence. This is why his inquiries are so often
regarded as mere 'snooping' into 'private affairs.'
Were it not for other, countervailing mechanisms in
society -- such as the institutionalization of
'privileged communications,' or 'data to be treated in
utter confidence' -- neither the social scientist
dependent upon free access to data on human behavior,
nor the other professionals, such as the doctor,
lawyer, and clergyman, who must also have this
information, would be able to carry out their social
roles. But since these social roles are instituionally
defined to include unflagging restrictions on making
observed departures from the code known to others, the
band of observability of deviant behavior can be
safely enlarged, without interfering with the
functional necessity for 'privacy,' 'secrecy,' or
'ignorance.'"
Methodologies do exist for the granting of anonymity in
social science research, but their need and application is
comparatively new. Basically, two modes of anonymous
protection have been used:
1. Participant anonymity in which experimental subjects
are identified to the researcher (who is constrained
to hold their identities in confidence), but not to
other subjects participating in the experiment.
2. Subject anonymity in which experimental subjects are
able to render private information and opinions
without revealing their identity to the researcher.
Various social science disciplines have developed means
for the protection of anonymity such as the use of masks in
psychodramas, but the most systematic means probably have

-10-

been used in survey research [8]. In survey research there
are four basic methods that have been employed to afford at
least operational anonymity to survey respondents.
1. The ballot box technique emulates the anonymity of
the election place by allowing respondents to
place their completed survey questionnaires in a

"secret ballot box." The interviewer does not have
access to the individual's opinions or reports
because the survey instruments are comingled. The
technique also can be employed by allowing
respondents to deposit their "votes" [9] through
the mail independently so as to deny interviewer
access to their reports.
2. Respondent questionnaire selection frequently is
combined with the ballot box technique. Respondents
can select questionnaires randomly from a stack of
questionnaires, or trade questionnaires back and
forth so that the data collector has no knowledge
of who is filling out which questionnaire. This
technique normally forestalls any attempt to
identify respondents through sureptitious coding
mechanisms [10].
3. Mail surveys can afford a degree of anonymity in
that the postmark usually is the only identifying
mark. Even postmarks, however, now offer little
identity because current postal practices
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increasingly call for sectional denotation rather
than more specific local or zone names in postal
cancellations.
4. A relatively new technique is the use of randomized
response which was developed to afford anonymity to
respondents in answering questions about such
sensitive subjects as drug usage, child abuse,
commission of crimes and other deviant forms of
social behavior. In this technique a respondent is
presented with matching sets of questions on
socially-acceptable behavior. The respondent
truthfully answers one of the questions, but does
not tell the interviewer whether the answer is to
the acceptable or to the non-acceptable question.
(The respondent chooses the question to be answered
through a randomization device such as flipping a
coin.) Responses by individual cannot be identified,
but the aggregate results can be calculated
statistically, and frequently turn out to be higher
and more in line with known incidence than those
obtained through more conventional methods. To
forestall any interviewer interpretation through
visual cueing reception, the ballot box or mail
survey mode frequently is used in conjunction with
this technique [11].
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Operationally, all four techniques afford anonymity, but
strictly speaking, respondent identity still could be
established in most cases through the use of such devices as
fingerprint identification or comparisons with previouslyknown handwriting samples. Use of such extreme uncovering
devices is highly unlikely now, but the potential for their
use will increase rapidly as such devices as computerassisted fingerprint identification and optical character
recognition become more refined and widespread.
The more common techniques of personal and telephone
interviewing afford only confidentiality because interviewers,
and frequently questionnaire data compilers, may have access
to respondents' names, addresses or telephone numbers.
Practically speaking, however, legitimate research
organizations institute safeguards to ensure the
confidentiality of responses. Additionally, the combination
of employee boredom, speed of processing, and sheer numbers
is likely to create de facto anonymity; that is; compilers
who process thousands of questionnaires a year are unlikely
to take the time or the interest to identify individual
responses.
Still, the respondent, who rarely is aware of these
constraints, is likely, and has every right to insist upon
the protection of private data given in confidence in a
survey. Misleading devices that intentionally threaten
that right can create havoc. Sales organizations,
particularly encyclopedia and magazine solicitation firms,
-13-

frequently conduct pseudo surveys to exploit the public trust
in bona fide surveys for their own ends. Even reputable
survey organizations have been known to use ultraviolet ink
or other sureptitious means to mark questionnaires for
control purposes. Public exposition of this practice has
been greeted with outrage, and widespread reforms have been
instituted within the survey field to forestall further use
of the practice [12]. The practice of some behavioral
scientists in using surveys and similar devices to disguise
the ulterior objectives of an experiment is receiving
closer scrutiny and it has been suggested that such ends
do not necessarily justify the means if those means entail
potential violation of human rights.
In most forms of survey research, respondents are
anonymous to each other, since the only interaction is
between the respondent and the interviewer. One form, the
focussed group interview, is employed to develop participant
interaction to produce cross-fertilization of respondent
ideas. A standard practice in forming such groups is to
stipulate that respondents have not met prior to the session
This affords a degree of operational anonymity in that
participants are unlikely to feel that their statements
will be identified outside the group by other participants,
but peer pressures and visual cueing biases may still be
present and vary in degrees of suppression only according
to the random personalities of the group and the group
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moderator's skills [13].
Delphi technique normally is thought of as a forecasting
or problem-solving ("policy delphi") tool, and not as a
survey instrument; although it can, and has been used to
collect survey data. That it is not used more frequently
to collect data is surprising because the technique can
feature both participant interaction and participant
anonymity [14]. Normally, subject anonymity is not attained
in delphi studies because the individual's identity is known
to the research compiler, who reiterates the previous
response set back to the participant for comparison with the
aggregate response. Compiler knowledge of participant
identities would be necessary for evaluational and validation
studies of the technique, but for conventional application
could be circumvented easily with no probable loss to the
experiment.
Taxonomically, the delphi method can be viewed as a member
of the class of structured group techniques that comprises
simulation games and models. A distinguishing characteristic
of some members of the class is that many are truly
interactive; that is, they are directed by the participants
and not by a moderator who is a researcher or a researcher's
agent who sets the agenda for the group. Such exercises
entail the need of a means of communications and typical
examples utilize human referees or computers as referees
that assess actions, relay messages, and introduce random events.
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As will be discussed later, true interaction could be
facilitated by the use of anonymity in computerized
conferencing for simulation games and models, and probably
extended to researcher-directed activities such as delphi,
opinion research and other social research mechanisms.
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SECTION III: Applications In Computerized Conferencing

Computerized conferencing could be said to consist of
the interactive use of private and shared cognitive space
by individuals and by groups.
This space can be structured through programmed or
social conventions.
Programmed conventions reflect the inherent
limitations of the computer hardware chosen for a
computerized conferencing system; the extant
limitations of supporting software, including
languages; and constraints or enhancements
purposely introduced in the software package.
Social conventions are guided by the constraints
imposed by what is possible through use of the
available programming; the awareness of the
limitations and capabilities for cognitive
transmission by members of the computerized
conferencing groups; and the development of
adaptive social mechanisms by individuals and by
groups to compensate for limitations and constraints
or to exploit inherent opportunities.
To simplify matters somewhat, subsequent sections of this
report are presented from the perspective of the Electronic
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Information Exchange System (EIES) of the Center for
Computerized Conferencing and Communications at the New
Jersey Institute of Technology. EIES has been chosen for
this exposition, not only because it is the computerized
conferencing system most familiar to the author, but because
it probably is the system most advanced in terms of developed
applications and of use by a diverse audience of members.
Turoff and Hiltz (1977) have identified four fundamental
services that have been incorporated in EIES.
Notebooks

Personal communication space
that may be shared with coauthors, for the developing and
editing of documents

Messaging

Dyadic or group communication
space

Conferencing

Closed group communication space

Bulletins

Public communication space for
on-line newsletters or journals

They identify ten additional services that are in various
stages of development for. computerized conferencing, four of
which may be of some importance to the current discussion:

Form generation and collection,
A microprocessor that functions as a full-fledged
conference member,
Model and simulation activities,
Directory.
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All these applications can present both opportunities and
pitfalls in uses entailing privacy, confidentiality or
anonymity.
In this section the opportunities will be explored; in
the following section the pitfalls that have been noted to
date will be discussed. It must be emphasized that although
EIES bears strong resemblance to the salient features of most
other computerized conferencing systems, both major and minor
hardware and software differences in other systems could
impose different programmed conventions with consequent
differences in adaptive social conventions.
Notebooks can be regarded as either private or
confidential instruments. Privately, the individual can use
the notebook to record, copy, arrange and synthesize thoughts
and information in the manner that people in the past have
used scrapbooks, diaries, filing cabinets and manuscript
drafts. These private thoughts and syntheses can be shared
with confidentiality.
§ A joint private space or notebook can be created by
inviting co-authors to assist in composition, critique
and editing.
§ Editors, peers, referees and others can be shown
notebook contents with an understanding that they are
not to be divulged to third parties without permission.
§ Copies may be made for confidential perusal by others.
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The notebook owner is the only person who knows which
other members have access to the notebook; that is, those
entering items into it will know who else may be reading
their comments only if the owner chooses to tell them.
Messaging presents the same opportunities, but
programming conventions and early user behavior indicate
that the recipients of messages can more readily transfer
message contents to third parties electronically. The
application of copyright laws to computerized conferencing
communications is not always clear, but some have suggested
that the recipient of a message can share in its ownership;
that is, rights of confidentiality may be achieved only
through observance of social protocol developed to protect
those rights by mutual agreement by both the sender and the
receiver of the item.
Conferencing precludes privacy, but members could agree
to confidentiality, and programming can be used to conduct
all or part of a conference through anonymous interchange
by participants who can elect or be constrained to enter
their remarks under labels of "anonymous" or by use of pen
names. The anonymous label is the more secure device in terms
of preserving anonymity, but the pen name facilitates
interchange by allowing other participants to follow a
particular chain of thought or to direct questions and
remarks to a specific participant.
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The Bulletin in its preparation provides opportunities
for anonymous interchange among authors, referees and
editors. In its promulgation it can be employed as a forum
for the anonymous expression of dissenting views, particularly
those that may be politically or socially unpopular. Through
use of pen names it can then become a public place for
anonymous debate of those views.
Form generation and collection can be viewed as the
computerized conferencing equivalent or application of
structured group processes such as survey research and
delphi studies. As such, it can function in much the same
manner as the mail survey technique described in Section II,
but at greater speed, and with enhanced features such as
programmed instruction to use filtering and branching
devices in questionnaires automatically, to offer systematic
explanatory notes, or to create possibilities for interviewer/
respondent interaction that cannot be attained in mail
correspondence. In this manner, computerized conferencing
can be employed to administer the simplest data gathering
instrument or highly complex interactive tasks that
synthesize a variety of group process techniques.
Operationally, respondents can be granted confidentiality or
true anonymity according to constraints presented in the
particular exercise [15].
A microprocessor can be used to facilitate confidential and
anonymous data collection. It can serve as an electronic
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"interviewer" that has no interest in the identity of an
individual save for processing purposes, and such entries
can be erased permanently once preset conditions have been
satisfied, e.g., prevention of double-voting, unauthorized
voting, etc. Its ability to transfer information, however,
can create problems as will be discussed in Section IV.
Modeling and Simulation activities can be regarded as
enhanced structural versions of messaging, conferencing and
data collection. In addition, the activities could be
employed to compensate for whatever a researcher may feel
is lost in not possessing the identity of anonymous
participants engaging in the activities.
A particularly interesting application is suggested by
Scher's (1977) review of Zuckerman and Horn's analysis of
simulation game communication processes (1973) in which he
concluded that computerized conferencing "...is in an
outstanding position through its ... capability for
anonymity (capability for deceit)." Within the current
context this observation can be noteworthy on two accounts;
1. It suggests that anonymity, used as a deceitful
mechanism, may serve as a positive disruptive force
in some future applications of computerized
conferencing.
2. By inference it could suggest that unmasking
anonymous communications, although undesirable
in conventional communications and problem-
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solving activities, could be desirable in some artificial
game modes that may be introduced in computerized conferencing.
In the latter regard, it should be noted that
communications intelligence in the form of intercept and
identification most peculiarly is not a normal function in
simulation conflicts, eventhough it can be a critically
important component of real life conflicts [16].
The Directory contains the names of computerized
conferencing network members, together with their mailing
addresses, telephone numbers, and self-descriptions of
characteristics and interests [17]. Associated programming
permits other network members to obtain these descriptions
or to conduct profile searches based upon key words to
locate individuals with similar interests, or living in a
given geographical area as defined by a postal zone or
telephone area code. Although the directory promotes obvious
advantages in presenting the means through which individuals
of similar interests or propinquity can locate one another,
it potentially is the source of abuses akin to those
currently encountered through telephone directories and
mailing lists: the computerized conferencing equivalents of
crank or even obscene telephone calls may eventually be met,
lists may be sold to commerical interests, and descriptions
could be utilized by marketing researchers to isolate aboveaverage prospects for goods and services.
The directory probably already serves to contradict an
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important asset of computerized conferencing, cueing anonymity.
As a verbal medium with only very limited graphic capability
in present form, computerized conferencing constrains
network members to judge received ideas largely in terms of
their intrinsic, expressed merit, rather than by such
potentially distracting elements as the ad hominem
characteristics of the ideas' generators. This functional
partial anonymity allows one to judge an idea without
reference to tone of voice, oral emphasis, ambience of
setting, facial expressions, body language, or similar
non-verbal cues. In cases where conferees have not met
face-to-face previously, judgments can be rendered without
reference to physical appearance, age, perceived physical
attractiveness [18], dress, or even sex [19]. A complete
dossier can do much to reduce this advantage if it contains
information that counteracts this aspect of anonymity [20].
Currently, directory information almost exclusively
presents positive information about network members.
Potentially, anonymous directory entries could be established
that would allow members to establish connections for the
exchange of information on socially-undesirable or sensitive
issues or characteristics. Computerized conferencing could
generate the electronic communications equivalent of the
"anonymous" or telephonic "hot line" to enable members who
wish to discuss such topics as alcoholism, gambling
addiction, narcotics addiction, overweightedness,
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homosexuality, extreme political opinions, and so forth, to
contact others with similar problems, inclinations or
expertise in the topics. Through use of pen names, such
contacts could be truly anonymous in contrast to current
encounters that frequently are only confidential, and
compromised to the extent that disclosure or fear of
disclosure is present.
Another major component of computerized conferencing,
that at the time of this writing was in developmental stages
is the collection. The collection is a structuring device
through which individual members or conferencing groups may
define computerized conferencing items, and organize them
according to personal or group preference. Although
citational schema for authors are commonplace in other
computerized systems, the EIES collection procedure goes
further and allows the collector to list items authored by
other members and even to incorporate listings of items
from data files or documents not contained in EIES. The
collection does not copy anything but merely references
other existing items and allows whoever can read the
collection to peruse those other items [21].
While collections are likely to be used initially by
members and groups to organize notebooks and bibliographies,
they also have the potential for becoming a structured means
through which attribution and priority of contribution to
group enterprises may be established and documented. In this
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manner the group as it moves towards a consensus position
would relegate each relevant contribution to the enterprise
to its proper place. Retrospective searches of the final
collection structure, and of interim structures, could be
used to document the relative contribution of each member
to the final outcome of the group's discussion or
experimentation. In extreme cases in which a group member
or sub-group of members disagreed with the consensus
position of that process, as delineated by the overall
group's collection, "minority collections" could be compiled
to advance alternative interpretations of the group's
progress and findings. The majority and minority versions
could then be submitted to mutually acceptable peers for
arbitration.
Part or all of the discussion and experimentation, as
synthesized and documented through collections could be
conducted through anonymous or pen name communication. At
a later date, as in a poker game, the true identities of
the authors of successful ideas could be revealed at each
author's option. By the same token, however, unsuccessful
ideas, that authors would just as soon have everyone forget
about, could be consigned to anonymous oblivion. It is
hypothesized that the combination of collections and
anonymity should foster freer and more productive group
processes. All members of a group would be assured that their
ideas, even when given anonymously, utlimately would be
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properly acknowledged. Unpopular or highly speculative
concepts could be advanced without fear of ridicule,
recrimination or loss of peer standing, and anonymous
challenge to any idea communicated could be made with
similar protection. This promises to be a major shift from
the results of more conventional media which frequently
are characterized by reluctance to advance unpopular or
nascent concepts, or to criticize the contributions of
other group members, especially those who are superiors or
acknowledged experts in the field of inquiry. Hiltz (1977),
for example, has hypothesized that,

"...negative reactions (Bale's categories 10, 11 and
12) will represent considerably higher proportions
of computerized conferencing comments, especially if
the capability for anonymous statements is present in
the system.... this should be an advantage of computer
conferencing as a communication mode for problemsolving, since it would represent less reluctance to
criticize bad ideas, and should lead to more frequent
high quality solutions." [Emphasis added.]
The collection, however, can pose some threats to
confidentiality. As it allows anyone viewing a collection of
titles to obtain also the original texts, the conditions for
inadvertent disclosure of confidential materials to third
parties are enhanced.
Pseudonyms and Masks
The participant nature of computerized conferencing tends
to produce procedures, conventions and protocols that are
user-defined. This condtion has lead to new applications of
the use of pen names beyond those originally envisioned.
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Kerr (1977) probably was the first to point out and
practice the use of the pen name in computerized conferencing
as a social convention.
"I use my pen name not in terms of cueing, but perhaps
as what may be called protocol, something of a
political sense to it, an agreement among friends to
message each other in humorous ways. Sometimes in
conferences, when I know it won't be anonymous, but
when I want to make a point of this current selfdefinition.
That is, I see a real distinction between my use of my
pen name and those occasions when I choose to be
anonymous; the first is humorous and friendly, the
second tends to be biting and sarcastic. But even the
second has never been used in serious conferences to
stab someone."
Wellman (1978) carries this theme one step further and
sees the use of pen names as masks that could enable their
users to agree to suspend social conventions.

"...rereading Durrell's The Alexandria Quartet, I was
struck by the similarities between a masquerade and
pen names in EIES. That is, it is not too tough to
figure out who a pen name 'really' is, but even so they
are useful. They are a way of distancing yourself from
your own identity, and more importantly, your routine
set of social roles, so that you can do/say new things.
The masquerades (the classical Durrell kinds with black
domino masks and balls in multiroom mansions) allowed
people to say/do such things as carrying on affairs
which they normally could not get into. Although most
people 'knew' who each other were, the distancing
effect of the mask allowed the polite fiction of
anonymous liberty."
In this same context a group of EIES members in an
informal conference once adopted such identities as
"Francois Marie Arouet," "Madame Du Chatelet," and
"Diderot," and conducted their exchange in French in the
manner of a salon dialogue of the period.
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The potential for future development of complex masks
and contrived social settings through computerized
conferencing may be great. One can speculate that individuals
will establish separate directory listings to match the
traits portrayed by their masking pen names. Such
descriptions could be particularly beneficial for those
afflicted with psychological disorders entailing multiple
personalities as a means of delineating their separate
characters for themselves and those who seek to help them.
In more rational discourse devil's advocacy could be raised
to a refined level through adoption or assignment of
stereotyped stances reflecting desirable points of view.
Members of a conference itself, in addition to adopting or
being assigned roles, could be constrained to conduct their
dialogue in a manner reflecting an historical model, e.g.,
a socratic dialogue, a French salon, a discussion among the
Encyclopaedists, an English science club, etc.
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SECTION IV: Barriers

Experimentation and use of computerized conferencing to
date has been confined largely to comparatively elite groups
of scientists, technologists and advanced students, many of
whom have received their primary training in the physical or
information sciences, and may thereby not be fully aware of
the ethical considerations surrounding rights of network
members to privacy, confidentiality or anonymity.
Fortunately, most if not all, bring to the enterprise codes
of ethics and practices developed through academic or
professional practice that mitigate very strongly against
any exploitation of their fellow members. It could be
surmised, however, that as computerized conferencing is
extended to a more general population, that members will
then include the usual assortment of knaves and fools. It
would seem imperative to design safeguards that would
forestall the former and protect the latter.
Some early computerized conferencing developers and
experimenters have engaged in "fun and games" activities
that have arisen spontaneously in recognition that
anonymous functions promised for the medium can be
compromised under extant programming and systems design.
Pen names, for example, can be compromised through the
following observed phenomena.
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Time Coincidence
Synchronously-received anonymous items can be crossreferenced to members currently on line in the network at the
time of receipt. Asynchronously-received items can be checked
against suspected senders' last period of activity as listed
in their directory descriptions.
Traffic Analysis
Participants tend to conform to set patterns of usage
according to time of day, days of the week, and frequency of
use. Examples: early sign-on, checking for messages before
the end of the business day, types of items composed and
transmitted during evening hours, use during weekends.
Geographic location frequently can be noted because of time
zones, e.g., eastcoast participants sign on early; westcoast
participants are more likely to sign on later in the day.
Participation
Participants have a choice of a number of private and
public conferences. Listing of those participating in the
private conferences is available, as is a marker system
denoting each member's progress in perusing the items in the
conference. Listings and markers of this type are not
available in public conferences, but participation gradually
can be determined through noting contributors' names and
through references to the conferences in other contexts.
Response Time
Members often vary according to their usual speed of
response. Some answer questions or enter comments in
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synchronous sequence or at least within an hour. Others
respond over a lengthier period of time.
Editing Sophistication
A wide range of sophisticated word processing and
programming techniques is available in advanced computerized
conferencing systems. Naturally, relative sophistication in
utilizing these devices to set formats, make corrections,
display ideas graphically, etc. varies widely, as does the
time lag between introduction of a new feature and its
adoption for use by individual members. Newer members in a
conferencing group may be conspicuous simply through
observation of common new-user mistakes.
Writing Characteristics
Individual traits are displayed and recognized in terms
of consistent spelling errors, typographical errors, use of
abbreviations, common expressions, and use of jargon.
Terminal Characteristics
Some terminals can be used to send messages in both
upper and lower case characters, others in upper or lower
but not both, and others in upper case only (TTY). Those
members having an option between upper and lower case
generally appear to tend towards use of lower case for
identified communications, but, interestingly, frequently
appear to switch to upper case when communicating in an
anonymous mode. Some terminals may be limited in terms of
special characters, so that presence or abscence of symbols
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can be discerned.
Subjective Style
Probably the most difficult characteristic of all to mask
is one's writing style which can serve as a personal
"fingerprint" for each communication. It seems likely that
Fogg and Flesch readability-type measurements could be
developed to identify individual authors. Intuitively,
members in constant contact over a period of time come to
recognize each other's individual styles through observation
of such things as paragraph and sentence length, word
sequence, vocabulary, grammatical form preference, and
punctuation.
Boasting
Some participants cannot seem to resist the temptation
to twit others about the source of anonymous remarks; others
will confess to being the authors of anonymous traffic; some
will attempt to mask the anonymous items through public
comments that express wonderment about their source; and
others simply will "protest too much."
Compromise
Inadvertently, an anonymous item might be entered that
through time coincidence or subject reference immediately
establishes a sole or limited range of sources. Triangular
coincidence can occur when party "C" refers to a matter
ennunciated by party "B" that identifies an item received
earlier by party "A". Mechanical errors are very rare, but
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when they do occur, inadvertent disclosure or compromise of
private, confidential or anonymous traffic can take place.
Somewhat more frequently, compromise can occur in the
process of introducing new programming features that may
offer opportunities for unforeseen disclosure before they
have been thoroughly tested and debugged.
Decoder Silence
One of the subtlest rules of decoding anonymous
identities is not to reveal success, but to maintain
silence so that the compromised party does not alter pen
names or traffic patterns, and so that others will not be
alerted to potential dangers. A patient traffic analyst
in this manner can reconstruct an entire network's anonymous
identities over an extended period of time.
Few of the techniques discussed above in and by themselves
will reveal the identity of a member making anonymous remarks,
but used in combination, even one who is deliberately trying
not to guess at identities is apt to see through the
masking intuitively. Because of frequent lack of sophistication
in such matters by many, even the careful practitioner of
anonymity stands ultimately to be revealed through a simple
process of elimination.
When it is considered that in times of war and in diplomatic
intrigue, encrypted communications conveyed by highly
sophisticated electronic means ultimately have been decoded
and identified with spectacularly successful (or disastrous)
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consequences, computerized conferencing traffic analysis
would appear to be child's play by comparison.
Security
As in any computerized system, computerized
conferencing's provisions for privacy, confidentiality and
anonymity ultimately can be compromised through sureptitious
entry into the host computer's data files. The degree of
privacy afforded by a computerized conferencing system to
the individual for use in private or confidential spaces
will be dependent upon the security effectiveness of the
system itself and the integrity of its implementors and
operators. By definition, private and confidential spaces,
and identification of adopted anonymous masks, are not
matters to be shared with others and entry to such contents
can be gained by another only through illegal means.
Unfortunately, even the most secure system can be compromised
by a determined, knowledgable person who can either pose as a
legitimate user, or worse, gain entry to the system's
programming structure, move freely within all system files,
and then erase any evidence of illegal entry.
It probably can be safely assumed that few, if any,
conference members would attempt to secure illegal
advantages for themselves. Further, the mature computer
conferencer is not likely to pursue any elaborate course of
traffic analysis, because of recognition that privacy,
confidentiality and anonymity functions can be of mutual
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benefit to all members. This assumption notwithstanding,
however, current system design inadequacies and participant
naivete can combine to aid inadvertent disclosures of
anonymous identities.
Confidentiality Protocol
Confidentiality poses problems that cannot always be aided
simply through enhanced design or programmed safeguards,
because it relies more upon the mutual trust of all members
concerned. The fragility of this trust was well demonstrated
in one heated debate that took place in an informal
conference. (See Appendix C for a transcript of the debate.)
A member of the conference took strong issue with the
current suggested protocol for treatment of confidential
items.
"If a private message is sent to you, it is considered a
a breach of confidence to copy it to another person
without explicit permission from the author. Because it
is very easy to copy to others the messages one
receives, without this norm of asking permission to
copy, one could never be sure that confidential
messages would remain so.
If you send a message to someone like a conference
moderator and you don't mind if it is copied into the
conference or to other conference members, say so
explicitly [22]."
The individual who objected to this protocol rested his
arguments against its adoption on assumptions that it:
§ is uneforcable,
does not rest on any current legal rights,
§ could contradict other conventions that the source
of ideas should always be acknowledged,
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§

§ inhibits free speech,
§ would be an incumberance entailing separate agreement
with all correspondents.
Unfortunately, the only substitute agreements he offered
are reducible to "let the sender beware" or "trust me"
conventions.
Neither of these suggested substitute protocols were at
all agreeable to the other conferees in the debate, who
instead suggested that failure to adhere to confidentiality
conventions and courtesies could:
compromise and take advantage of the naivete and
trust of the new conferee,
§ lead to uncertainty and inhibit personal
communications,
§ entrap anyone not aware of a receiver's presumed
"right" to compromise any assumed confidentiality,
§ inhibit side discussions considered necessary for
clarification or for preparation of more formal
public remarks,
§ lead to conditions of alienation in extreme cases.
Those endorsing the EIES confidentiality protocol
argued that it could be enhanced by:
§ requirement of explicit statements of intent by
anyone not intending to abide by it,
§ insertion of explicit instruction to not copy any
communications considered to be especially
confidential,
use of discretion in communicating confidential
matters until such time a new correspondent is known
well enough to be entrusted in such matters,

-37-

§ addition of programmed conventions that would
disallow at the sender's option, a message to be
copied,
§ or, all else failing, discipline of the asocial
behavior in this regard through extreme reduction
or total suppression of all further communication
with the miscreant party.
A false sense of confidentiality can be created through
the use of blind copies of messages. Normally, the addresses
of messages are indicated in the message banner, but some
systems allow the sender to suppress this information. This
could create the false illusion for the receiver that he or
she is the sole recipient of the message, when in fact others
may be receiving it as well. In formal experimental settings
blind copies might very well be sent to experiment monitors
without the knowledge of the experimental subjects to whom
they ostensibly are directed exclusively. This practice
could call into question concerns about human subject rights.
Blind copying of the subjects' own messages to a monitor
without their knowledge would, of course, be a case of
simple electronic eavesdropping.
Anonymity Abuses
Additional abuses of anonymity functions have been
hypothesized and tested through the fun and games of early
computerized conferencing experimenters. First, pen names
can be misappropriated by others if programming constraints
against this practice are not present. Very simply: one
could use a recognized pen name as one's own and create
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mischief. One could even set a proper name of a member as
a pen name if safeguards are not taken. Such manipulation
could be very subtle and deceiving to the uninitiated who
are unaware of computer programming capabilities. For
example, programs could be set that would allow only one
person to enter a given name or pen name, but a clever
computer forger could make use of non-visual characters
to fool some programs, e.g., set John (space) Smith as
John (control key) Smith. In the example given, both
forms would appear identical on the printed transcript
or CRT screen display, but would be treated as being
quite distinct by the system's central processing unit.
Secondly, it is assumed that as computerized
conferencing becomes more widespread, it will become prone
to such annoyances of alternative communications media as
abusive or obscene messages sent by anonymous or pen name
mode. The problem would be compounded by the misuse of the
pen name as suggested above; that is, asocial messages sent
under a misappropriated name or pen name would create even
greater mischief.
Interfacing Compromises
In the future as computerized conferencing systems
proliferate and as larger networks are formed and
microprocessors and other hardware are used to interface
a given system with other systems, both programmed and
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social conventions may be altered in ways that would pose
threats to members' rights to privacy, confidentiality
and anonymity. The means for electronic transfer to
another system would exist and that system might not
contain the same programmed safeguards found in the
system in which the member originally enters an item. Once
an item is transferred to another system the author may no
longer have a say in the social conventions governing
protocols concerned with the protection of privacy,
confidentiality and anonymity. Further, for very valid
reasons, a person who participates in more than one
computerized conferencing system, may just as soon not have
system "A" know that equivalent or related data are being
used in system "B" [23].
Monitoring Abuses
Computer systems are susceptible to monitoring by outside
agencies. Hiltz and Turoff (1978) suggest that systems could
be programmed to check traffic for certain words and phrases
and inform authorities when a word such as "murder" has
occurred so they could then obtain a warrant to read the
item. They report that some suggest this could be considered
the right of police to patrol but not a violation of privacy
or eavesdropping because no human has actually read or
"heard" the item text. Although this reasoning may sound
quite sophistic, stranger events have occurred in the name
of "law and order" or "national defense."
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SECTION V: Suggested Enhancements

Security.
Ultimately, the most effective means to protect privacy
and to maintain confidentiality and anonymity in
telecommunications probably will be attained through the
use.of computer-assisted cipher encoding and decoding.
Until relatively recently the only truly unbreakable
cipher has been the "one-time pad;" a random number-based
system that is successful, but both time-consuming and
logistically complex in its administration. A more
promising method has been suggested by Gardner (1977),
and is based upon the "trapdoor codes" of Diffie and
Hellman (1975) and the subsequent proposal for the use of
prime number signatures for such codes by Rivest et al.
(1977). Operationally, codes of this type promise the
development of double encoding mechanisms utilizing
encoding and decoding algorithms which feature unique
identifiers for both sender and receiver based upon factors
of prime numbers. The ciphering system is such that the
encoding mechanism can be made public, so that it would
have practical use in group situations as in computerized
conferencing, but the decoding algorithm for each member
is maintained in secrecy. Without the decoding algorithm,
it has been estimated that current computer technology
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would require millions of years to decipher the encoded text.
The procedure also provides a unique signature for each
member so that no member's signature can be forged. It
would appear to be just a matter of time before appropriate
hardware and software will be developed for the automatic,
user-transparent implementation of these methods for public
use in applications such as computerized conferencing.
Member Rights
The form feature could be used to inform computerized
conferencing members of their rights to confidentiality and
anonymity. Statements devised by a conferencing group or
those embodying the requirements of federal regulations or
professional codes of ethics regarding the rights of
experimental subjects could be transmitted to the members
as a message form. The participants' receipt of the form
would be registered automatically and the sender would receive
written confirmation of the date and time of receipt. More
positive acknowledgment could be obtained by also including
within the form a question form such as that shown below.
I HAVE READ, UNDERSTOOD AND AGREE TO THE CONDITIONS
GOVERNING MY PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE. (Y/N/?)
[if ?]
I REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION BEFORE AGREEING
TO PARTICIPATE: (ENTER YOUR QUESTIONS HERE.)
The use of such a form would provide several distinct
advantages over current methods: 1) It provides both the
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member and the experimenter or group leader with full
documentation of all agreements. 2) Participant questions
can be answered directly by the experimenter or group
leader instead of through an intermediary such as a survey
interviewer or computer console operator who may not be as
qualified to understand all aspects and implications of
the questions. 3) The asynchronous nature of computerized
conferencing gives the participant sufficient time to
consider the question of participation before reaching a
decision. 4) Interaction should be less awkward than what
may occur when an interviewer or other agent reads to the
participant his/her rights in the fashion of a police
officer reading to a criminal his/her rights to remain
silent.
Special protocols may have to be developed to protect
member rights of confidentiality in notebooks. Because a
notebook owner is the only person with direct knowledge of
who else is reading the notebook, the potential for
entrapment of confidential material by third parties
unknown to an author will exist. This problem could be
alleviated through requirements that a notebook owner
either inform all notebook authors of who else has access
to the notebook, or that a statement be given to all
potential authors that anonymous readers of the notebook
are present.
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Thwarting Inadvertent Disclosure
System programming could be employed to eliminate some
sources of anonymous unmasking.
Anonymous or pen name items could be converted
automatically to TTY (upper case only) format.
6 Special terminal characters, especially control
key functions, not commonly encountered could be
disallowed in pen name communication.
User-specified or systematic time delays could be
incorporated to eliminate establishment of time
coincidence disclosure. (Such a feature would have
to vary according to context; a synchronous activity
might feature a maximum delay of ten minutes'
duration, an asynchronous conference might allow a
maximum of 48 hours.)
6 Future developments in word processing would
eliminate common misspellings. As EIES Interact
language evolves, users may very well develop
their own procedures to edit for the elimination of
such self-recognized problems as poor spelling,
split infinitives, dangled participles, and
sentences ended with prepositions.
Preventing Misappropriation of Pen Name
When members are given a free hand in setting or changing
pen names, potential abuse, as discussed earlier, exists for
using a pen name to mimic the proper name or pen name of
another member. This potential abuse has been forestalled by
two principal means: 1) at the elementary level of- programmed
conventions that do not allow the use of another member's
name as a pen name; 2) by the use of distinctive identifying
marks such as "John Smith" or John Smith *to denote that the
name is a pen name.
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The mimicry of pen names or their cognates could be
forestalled through adoption of programmed conventions that
would disallow further use of any pen name previously, but
not necessarily still being used, entered for a given period
of time, e.g., the duration of an exercise, 30 days, six
months, one year.
Confusion can occur when pen names are used to mimic
official-sounding titles such as system monitoring titles,
government agency designations, or institutions. Social
conventions disallowing the use of such names could be
established and reinforced by authorization of system
monitors to censor out any such pen names as they occur.
Minimizing Misapplication of Pen Names
The social use of pen names discussed earlier, although
useful in some contexts, can become a liability in more
serious discussions. The user of the pen name could adopt
uncharacteristic attributes associated with the selfperception of the pen name, and other conference members
could attribute positive or negative characteristics to its
user. To cite just two examples observed in EIES conferences:
"Wonder Woman" for some might evoke images of a militant
feminist, and "Alvey Singer" of a Woody Allen-type eccentric.
This creates a synthetic problem in which the original
purpose of the pen name, the creation of anonymity and
elimination of ad hominem judgments, is replaced by
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potentially complex fictitious assumptions about an idea's
generator.
The resolution of this problem would appear to lie in
the use of the military-type code book compilation of
blocks of standard pen names that could be allocated to
groups for use by their members. Each member would be
assigned one or more names to be used within the group.
(Cross-group usage would simply aid others in establishing
identification through elimination processes.) The names
would have to be selected carefully to minimize
hierarchical, ordinal or anthropomorphizing effects. For
example, proper nouns of natural objects could be used,
such as:
Ash, Beech, Birch, Maple, Teak (but not Oak or Ebony)
Mallard, Oriole, Sparrow, Tanager, Wren (but not
Hawk, Dove or Loon!)
Member Item Deletion Control
One of the simplest, but most effective means for
providing privacy and confidentiality is to allow a member
to delete an item. Quite commonly, members in most systems
may delete any item they originally authored. In a private
space such as a notebook this presents few problems. In a
confidential space such as a message system or conference
problems can occur because those receiving an item may be
able to copy it before the author has a chance to delete it.
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This difficulty could be overcome by programming conventions
that would allow an author to specify that an item be
deleted automatically upon receipt.
There are occasions when the receiver of a message may
wish to be able to exercise the privilege of deleting it
because it is felt it contains information that should not
be a matter of record or copied elsewhere. Programmed
conventions could be developed to provide this option.
Members should be fully informed of the computerized
conferencing system's definition of "deletion." To some it
might come as a surprise to learn that an item that to
their mind has been deleted may still actually exist in the
computer memory, because only the system link to that item
has been deleted. In such cases the potential exists for an
operator to retrieve the supposedly deleted item. In those
systems in which the memory supposedly has been erased as
a condition of deletion, the potential for recovering the
erased item may still exist. Expensive devices have been
developed to recover computer memory information that has
been accidentally erased, and such devices since they deal
with digitalized data can be more effective than those used
in attempts to recover the complex impulses of erased audio
recording tapes.
Member Reception Control
As currently constituted, computerized conferencing
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gives the individual member little control over messages
that are sent to the member. Currently this presents
difficulties only in terms of information overload, viz.,
lengthy items from verbose correspondents that arrive at
inopportune times. This generally creates only minor and
transient problems. The potential, however, for receiving
truly unwanted material, ranging from junk mail to obscene
or threatening messages sent anonymously, creates a need
for greater user control of reception. Fortunately, computer
architecture creates possibilities for exercising such
control without involving system operators in complex
questions of carrier responsibilities and ethics; that is,
systems can be programmed to exclude classes of items upon
reasonable user request without any human operator having to
have knowledge of the excluded senders, or for that matter,
of those requesting such exclusions.
In the case of nuisance items such as those that may
contain obscene material and which are sent
anonymously, programs could be devised by which a
user upon receiving such an item could enter a
command that would tell the system that no further
items that are unsigned (anonymous or pen name) can
be transmitted to the user from the member who sent
the miscreant item. The anonymous messager in such
an instance would be informed of this condition
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upon trying to send any further anonymous items
addressed to the aggrieved party.
§ Program conventions could be introduced to prevent
the transmission of such matters as obscene words
or racist pejorative words. (Such conventions,
however, would have to be examined carefully to
determine the extent to which they could
constitute prior censorship.)
§ To cut down the flow of computerized conferencing
junk mail equivalents, conventions could be
established that: 1) Members can request their
names be removed from any address lists for
prespecified classes or origins of traffic; that is,
obtain rights to removal from lists as can be
obtained in conventional mailing operations. 2) In
recognition that some unsolicited items can be of
potential, but unpredictable, value, senders of
such materials could be assessed full costs of
sending and receiving.
Confirmation
Ultimately, the seemingly innocuous confirmation of
received items could become an important aspect of
computerized conferencing communications. Unlike most
conventional telecommunications media, the sender of an item
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does not always have assurance that the person receiving
an item is the intended person: it could very well be
received by an operator using the terminal on the
designated recipient's behalf or by someone who is sharing
the intended recipient's network membership. The sender may
not always be aware of such conditions and could be trapped
into sending information not intended for third parties.
Currently, the only practical resolution of this problem is
to restrict sending of such items to times when prior
synchronous assurance has been obtained from the intended
recipient that he/she is in fact utilizing the receiving
terminal and that others are not present. In the future,
personal decoding algorithms, as discussed earlier, should
circumvent this problem. (Their use would also constitute
certification of receipt.)
Interfacing Conventions
The problems that will be created through the interfacing
of computerized conferencing networks or through conference
access and transmittal to other computerized systems are far
from clear, but it is anticipated that conferencers will find
themselves confronting problems not unlike those now created
through merger of data files by government and private
agencies.
As microprocessor and other computer-assisted interfacing
capabilities emerge it may become necessary to develop
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concomitant programmed conventions to ensure that conferencers'
rights are not compromised inadvertently or through malevolent
action by those understanding the weaknesses of such
arrangements. At this time three constraints that could be
imposed on an interfacing system can be hypothesized.
1. Members should receive automatic notification upon
each and every instance that information they have
authored in a conferencing system or information
about their behavior in using that system is
transferred outside the system.
2. Protocols and conventions should be developed through
which categories of member information or memberauthored items can be transferred only with prior
and explicit consent by the member.
3. Members should never be required to rely solely
upon system facilities to undertake all transfer
operations, but should be given options to
undertake these activities themselves through
whatever off-line channels they may have access to.
In this manner, the individual member can exercise
greater control over private, confidential or
anonymous intellectual and behavioral property.
Expediency vs. Participation
Undoubtedly, implementation of these suggestions and
other safeguards undertaken to protect computerized
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conferencing members' rights to privacy, confidentiality and
anonymity will prove to be irksome in some instances to
members, conference operators and conference leaders alike.
It must always be borne in mind, however, that what may
sometimes appear initially to be a programming barrier or
impediment to smooth communications or group processes, may
in fact later prove to be an important element that will
actually improve upon those processes. In the final analysis,
human rights and intellectual and psychological freedom can
be at stake in these issues, and "expediency" and the natural
desire to attain quick implementation of exciting new
technologies should never be allowed to compromise the human
element that constitutes the very reason for their development.
The early experience of computerized conferencing has
suggested that it has outstanding potential to become a
truly participant-directed computerized medium. Unlike most
other computer applications, computerized conferencing leads
to hands-on experience for its members. Most, after they
overcome the short initial mechanical difficulties, become
quite adept at using the new system. To their pleasant
surprise they discover that they do not require support
personnel to assist them in the use of their terminals and
that they can perform a wide range of functions for themselves.
Once this confidence has been acquired, many then turn to the
system itself and to varying degrees ask, or even demand, to
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participate in its further design and refinement. By the same
token, system operators and designers are confronted with
sophisticated users who no longer passively acquiesce to
their decisions, but to their surprise offer countersuggestions for system enhancement. At this point the line
between users and implementors becomes increasingly blurred.
Implementors find they must accomodate user-defined social
conventions, and special languages such as EIES Interact
are evolving to permit users to construct their own programmed
conventions and structures within the system.
This trend undoubtedly will continue, and computerized
conferencing systems will become more participant-defined in
their applications. In the context of the current discussion,
this should mean that network members will be in a better
position to ensure the protection of their rights to privacy,
confidentiality and anonymity.
It is likely that some groups, notably those that are
industrial, military or governmental in orientation, will at
least initially resist participant direction. They may be
expected to desire the retention of more conventional
organization hierarchies and knowledge of the communications
by subordinate members. It should be interesting to note the
ways, if any, in which such stances in turn will succumb to
member demands for greater participation in conferencing
processes and structural definition. Future experience may
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demonstrate that organizations may evolve in ways that will
replace centralized and hierachical structures with
decentralized participant structures.
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SECTION VI: Conclusions

Historically, privacy, confidentiality and anonymity have
facilitated cognitive interaction. The development of
computerized conferencing both enhances and presents new
challenges to these conditions.
Computerized conferencing for the first time offers facile
and effective anonymous communication within a structured
environment. As such, it facilitates the attainment of a
long-sought goal: the judgment of ideas and information
without respect to their origins or distracting ad hominem
cueing elements. This development both improves upon previous
communications modes and creates opportunities for the
construction of more sophisticated group interaction
mechanisms attuned to the complex needs of contemporary
science and society.
As is the case with most technological developments,
computerized conferencing has been handicapped initially by
psychological and mechanical shortcomings encountered in the
transition from the previous technology to the new
technology and its associated cognitive structures. It would
appear, however, that as experience is gained through use of
the new medium, structured means are being developed to
overcome the barriers that compromise the effective use of
privacy, confidentiality and anonymity.
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Cognitively, computerized conferencing creates an
environment in which the proper relation of private to public
ideas is better understood. Mechanically, programming
structures are being developed to protect user privacy and to
employ confidential and anonymous modes properly in
promulgation of group members' private cognitive property
into syntheses of policy and scientific structures.
It is hypothesized that through computerized conferencing,
privacy, confidentiality and anonymity will develop into
formal, recognized modes of expression and cognition that
will be beneficial to both individuals and to the society of
which they are a part.
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APPENDIX A: Nomenclature
In contemporary usage, "privacy," "confidentiality" and
"anonymity" unfortunately frequently are treated by many as
synonyms. Roget's Thesaurus, for example, lists privacy and
confidentiality as synonyms, and further appears to
emphasize their association to the pejorative aspects of the
terms, e.g., stealthy, sly, underhanded. Confusion of these
terms with anonymity is rarer, but in the survey research
field at least, confusion of anonymity with confidentiality
appears to be relatively commonplace.
Dictionary definitions appear to assign more specific
meanings to the terms. Consider first, the meanings of privacy
that seem pertinent to this inquiry.
Privacy 1. The state or condition of being withdrawn
from the society of others, or from public interest;
seclusion.
2. Private or retired places; private apartments;
places of retreat.
b. A secret place, a place of concealment.
3. Abscence or avoidance of publicity or display; a
condition approaching to secrecy or concealment.
4. A private matter, a secret.
5. Intimacy, confidential relations.
6. The state of being privy to some act.

*

The definitiions cited in this Appendix are taken from the
Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Only those definitions
pertinent to the scope of this report have been included.
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Private 1. Withdrawn or separated from the public body.
3. Kept or removed from public view or knowledge; not
within the cognizance of people generally; concealed,
secret.
4. Of a thing: Not open to the public; restricted or
intended for the use or enjoyment of particular and
privileged persons.
c. In many connexions private is used to distinguish
something that is not open to the public, or not
publicly done or performed.
Although there is some suggestion in these definitions
that there are confidential aspects of privacy, these
definitions are listed secondarily to stronger senses of
personal privacy. The sharing of privacy would seem to be
done only in the most intimate or highly privileged manner.
In this sense, current EIES nomenclature of "private
notebooks" appears to be an appropriate use of privacy, but
"private messages" would appear to be too broad a designation.
This interpretation appears to be reinforced by
definitions of confidentiality.
Confidential 2. Of the nature of confidence; spoken or
written in confidence; characterized by the communication
of secrets or private matters. Confidential communication:
a communication made between parties who stand in a
confidential relation to each other, and therefore
privileged in law.
3. Betokening private intimacy, or the confiding of
private secrets.
4. Enjoying the confidence of another person; entrusted
with secrets; charged with secret service.
Confidence 1. The mental attitude of trusting in or
relying on a person or thing; firm trust, reliance, faith.
5. An object or ground of trust.
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6. The confiding of private or secret matters to another;
the relation of intimacy or trust between persons so
confiding; confidential intimacy.
7. A confidential communication.
8. Trustworthiness, as a personal quality.
Confident 1. Trustful, confiding.
Confide 1. To trust or have faith; to put or place
trust, repose confidence in.
4. To impart as a secret, to communicate in confidence.
5. To entrust (an object of care, a task, etc.) to a
person, with reliance on his fidelity or competence.
Note above in particular that confidentiality entails
elements of implied communication, trusting and
trustworthiness not associated with privacy. The last
definition cited is particularly interesting as it would
appear to place the onus upon the receiver not only for
fidelity, but for competence in maintaining that fidelity as
well. The definitions associated with confidentiality would
appear to be superior as a description for the implied trust
in computerized conferencing messaging. At some future date,
consideration might be given to labelling messages as
"confidential messages" on the premise that recipients may
be less prone to betray a confidence than to claim ownership
of something which by definition, or only through extensive
negotiation, may no longer be private. In certain instances,
it might also be helpful to use terms such as "confidential
notebooks" and "confidential conferences."
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The definitions of anonymity are straight-forward, and
suggest there should be little confusion with either privacy
or confidentiality.
Anonymous 1. Nameless, having no name; of unknown
name.
b. Hence ... A person whose name is not given, or is
not known.
2. Bearing no author's name; of unknown or unavowed
authorship.
The OED defines "pen name" simply as a pseudonym, but
it is noteworthy that in the definition of anonymous, the
suggested derivation is from the Greek 'αv (private) +
s/ olµα (name). In this sense it is the equivalent of the
modern pen name.
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APPENDIX B: EIES Policy Statement, Murray Turoff, Oct. 1, 1977

PRIVACY AND OWNERSHIP
The written material in a system of this sort has a certain degree of uncertainty with respect to ownership under
copyright regulation, common law treatment of mail or various
laws governing computer data bases. However, our NSF contract
contains the following:
"Provide complete security and confidentiality of user's research information
in transit through EIE(S) or stored in
EIE(S).The Contractor will take all
steps necessary to assure that data
stored in the EIE(S) system will be
confidential and that no one but the
original user who stored the information and data will have access to these
data. These data are the result of research projects not funded by this award."
Under this clause we shall do everything reasonable within budget and available technology to insure your privacy on
an individual or group basis. We further interpret this clause
to mean that we can refuse any requests from outside parties
such as other government agencies for any EIES material. We
shall, therefore, refuse to provide such information and will
instead direct such parties to the author of the material requested.
However, I must point out that EIES is a Communication
system as well as an Information system. We Cannot take any
responsibility for what use members of EIES make of any material directed to them by others. Thus, the system participants
should be governed by the same ethical considerations governing
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private or professional communications. We take the position
that material entered in PUBLIC conferences, notebooks and
bulletins may be quoted as one would with any other open publication. Therefore, authors should indicate in these public
files when they are entering preliminary drafts whether it
should or shouldn't be quoted (as one would normally do with
a pre-print draft). As to private and group messages, private conferences and private notebooks, the individuals and
groups involved must establish their own standards for handling the privacy of their material. Also, we hope the evaluators for each group will establish clear policies for his or
her group.
You should be aware that the EIES technical staff can, if
necessary, gain access to any material entered in the system.
However, they are well aware of and sensitive to the need not
to violate privacy. In some rare cases you may find a need
to request us to fix something for you requiring that we exercise this power. In any such case you will be notified of
this occurrence. For example, in a hardware malfunction, a
data record of some sort may be damaged and the process of
fixing it may require a check to verify that the right text
item has been restored. Hopefully this will occur infrequently.
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STATISTICAL DATA REPORTING
Our contract states in reference to our monthly progress
report:
"For each user and for each group
of users the data will be presented
under the following headings: number of messages or transactions,
type of transaction (message, conference, etc.) and EIE(S) connect
time."
Therefore, each month a statistical report will be furnished NSF listing each user's monthly and accumulated statistics for the following items in terms of sent/composed and
received:
-------

number of private messages
number of group messages
number of conference comments
number of notebook pages
hours of use'
number of times on.

However, NSF has assured us that all they need is the
information reported for an individual identified by a code
which does not inform them of who the individual is. The
key to the code will be kept at NJIT and the subset for any
particular group will be provided the principle investigator
for a particular group.
A copy of the NSF report will be provided each individual
responsible for the evaluation of a particular group. In any
internal evaluations of the EIES operation that we make ourselves it will be our policy in any of the resulting reports
or papers to maintain the anonymity of users concerning the

-63-

representation or analyses of data on usage. We will request
that all the group evaluators follow the same policy before
we issue these reports to him or her.
For any particular group more detailed data will be
available to the group's evaluator through the principle investigator and he or she will have policies for handling data
derived from your group's activity.
However, I must point out that even without specific names
mentioned, data presentations may make it easy for some participants on the system to identify certain members. For example,
during the past year I have been the most frequent user and
anyone else who has been using the system can identify my data
point on any distribution of usage.
Together with the evaluators we hope in the next year to
develop firmer concepts of what are meaningful measures of performance and impact in systems of this sort. We shall do our
best to keep you informed of progress in this area.
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APPENDIX C: Discussion of Copying of Prviate Messages

The moderator of an informal conference disagreed with the
EIES protocol convention on message confidentiality, prompting
the following heated and insightful exchange of opinion. (The
names of the participants have been replaced by designations
of PERSON A, PERSON B, etc.; pen names by "ALPHA," "BETA.")

C117

CC210

PERSON A

8/ 8/77 2:01 PM

I have just received the new instruction booklet for EIES
[Turoff and Johnson-Lenz 1977] and would like to take
exception to "3. Maintaining the Privacy of Private Messages."
1) It is impossible to enforce the not sending of messages
onto others, and
2) I believe legal tradition gives letters to the person who
receives them, and
3) I neither like to keep secrets nor wish to appropriate
others' ideas as my own.
C117

CC211

PERSON B

8/ 8/77

9:19 PM

Re Person A's 210:
Knowing this is your point of view about privacy, I am
going to be very careful about what I send to you as a
private message. Several times already you have copied into
conferences messages I have sent to you privately and never
expected to see in a conference. So far, nothing embarrassing
or too private has been shared, but I never know. As of now,
I will only be sending messages to you, Person A, that I
consider public. That may restrict my communication with you,
but so be it.
C117

CC216

PERSON C

8/ 8/77 10:09 PM

Is this system like a letter or is it like the publication of
an idea which you should be able to copyright or its
equivalent. It's neither and a little of both. Afraid Person
A, I agree with Person B.
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C117

CC217

PERSON A

8/ 9/77

10:02 AM

I'm not sure how to put this. I would rather that Person B
didn't send me something than that I had to consider it
private. I agree with Person C that exactly what a msg is
is a little difficult to define, but I would rather copy a
msg than the ideas in it. Also, I would never want to make a
profit at the expense of someone else's ideas.
Sometimes I do have the good sense to "not bother
bringing something up." At least one person in this
conference should realize that. If it is clear to me that
something is sent privately, and it does not appear to be
concerned with a shady or illegal matter, I won't bring it up
with anyone else; but if someone is going to send me anything
like that they should make that clear in the body of the text,
and know that I am not happy to be receiving such messages. I
feel this way for essentially the same reasons I got involved
in a rather heated argument earlier.
This may be a bit brash, especially considering where I
work; but as I indicated earlier, I don't intend to play by
those rules. End of sermon...
C117

CC219

PERSON D

8/ 9/77

1:24 PM

I have to agree with Person B regarding the practice that
has to be adopted in messaging you, Person A, and I feel I
must follow the same policy.
Actually we or at least I should thank you for being so
explicit about what you intend to do or not do, and therefore
clarifying for us what to do when messaging you. But the
rather petulant and obtuse attitude you continue to display
in CC217 shows, I think, that you are missing the point about
degrees of exclusivity or privacy which many of us find a
valuable dimension of this system -- as it is in "regular"
life -- and because you take the view you do you are cutting
yourself off from a kind of relating and communication that
this system offers.
It is not that shady or illegal matters are private, and
everything else can be public. I hope we aren't discussing
shady or illegal matters in "private" or here (this is just
as public and just as private as telephones or telegrams, in
general).
The point as I see it is that some things, perhaps often
of a critical nature but sometimes also of a comforting or
caring or connecting nature, come across much more
authentically and fully if they can be said to the person
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for whom they are intended alone. Not that I or we
particularly want to have that kind of private access right
now to you, but we might want to have it in the future, and
we regret that that possibility is removed by your
announced policy.
In general, if one wants to send a message to another on
the system and wants to be sure that only that person does
see it and does not copy it to others, this can simply be
said at the beginning or end of the message. The recipient
is then honor bound to abide by that request, or at least
to request permission to copy saying to whom he/she wants
to copy, to the original sender. Conceivably it should be
possible to program the system to electronically "fix" some
messages so that they could not be copied, and this would be
a command added by the sender at the time of sending. But I
hope that will not be done. It is better for our
relationships to and with each other on this system if we
manage our messaging with mutual respect for each other's
wishes regarding confidentiality.
C117 CC223

PERSON B

8/ 9/77

2:25 PM

8/ 9/77

2:45 PM

I sent a poem to my love
and hoped she'd hold it to her heart.
I didn't ask her to be discreet
Since I had written it just to her.
Why did she show it to her friends
who laughed, not knowing
that my heart sang
as I wrote?
C117 CC225

PERSON A

My being is not me,
for I cannot see me,
but if you ask me to show myself
I'll show you you as me.
I talk in vicious cycles,
never knowing quite why
other's try to hide themselves,
and I can't show what I try.
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Sing of joy, I cry...
but only tears prevail,
for what I see is
horrible
I'll fight it 'till I die.
If I hide in platitudes, or
wallow in the mud...
I'm just as damned in solitude
as in the public flood.
No need to follow my path
You can as soon sink within your own.
But if you don't give me my path,
I'll damn your very bones.
(I'm going to add a warning to my description...)
C117 CC226

PERSON E

8/ 9/77

2:49 PM

About the privacy and copying issues: To me, it's simply
a matter of trust, as Person B put so well earlier in this
conference. Person A's CC210 was interpreted, by me and I
think by others, as stating publicly that he can't be trusted.
This copying norm has received some scattered attention on
line; it is an important issue, but clearly also one that
avoids a simple answer. My own opinion is that it's a
question of common sense, good manners, courtesy and trust.
These are constructed as we get to know people electronically,
as we "test" them, and as we learn how they can be trusted.
The private message system component of EIES is crucial for
the conferencing component for many reasons, including
clarification, letting off steam, side comments on ongoing
issues, etc.
Person A, another aspect of this that disturbs me is
your messaging me several times that you didn't "really know
me," wanted to get to know the "real me" better, etc. Now,
what would you have done with that info, anyway? Person A,
you ask Person F to relate to you, accusing Person B of being
"reluctant to become involved in our learning about each
other." On the basis of the messages following that, can you
now understand why they, like I, feel this way? I feel very
strongly that the entire issue is a question of trust, and
that you have clearly stated, many times, that you neither
want nor deserve our trust. If this is "bouncing off each
other," it cannot be helped.
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C117 CC227

PERSON B

8/ 9/77

2:50 PM

I don't see this as a free speech/free press issue. Rather,
for me it has much more to do with trust among people
communicating in this electronic wonderspace. Just as I know
friends and neighbors whom I can't trust to always be
discreet (and so I don't tell them sensitive things), so
there are probably people in a cc environment who similarly
pass things along that I might not like to see made public.
Person A, perhaps I can come to a working compromise. If I
clearly label private messages to you as private, will you be
willing to keep them that way? Then you don't have to be
responsible for figuring out what's confidential and what's
not. I would be willing to follow this arrangement with you.
C117 CC228

PERSON A

8/ 9/77

3:23 PM

I am reasonably happy with the arrangement, you don't have to
label every msg, just the topic. What bothers me is that the
norm EIES is promoting will require that I come to the same
understanding with everyone. As I think that information
should be generally free, I really would prefer if the
understandings would be made the other way around. If I have
to make that understood to everyone I meet on line I won't
have room in my [directory] description to say anything else
about myself.
I don't see this as a matter of trust, to me it is a matter
of the cost of information...Person E, I can be trusted when
it is clear to me that there is something about the subject
which would restrict (as a matter of course) the logical
audience to myself. I hope that you understand.
C117 CC230

"ALPHA".

8/ 9/77

4:25 PM

"The norm EIES is promoting" is the only reasonable one to
promote. Only some information should be free. I do think,
however, that you must make your position clear to- everyone
you speak to on line.
C117 CC231

PERSON A

8/ 9/77

4:48 PM

Why is it reasonable? What is my position? Why would I want
to send copies to everyone, or of everyone's, I speak to on
line? And having fully expressed myself, I think that
Person E's norm of feeling people out to decide what part of
them is public makes the most sense (I think I slightly
mangled what she said). For your benefit, if I give you
anything I would rather were not public, it's my problem, not yours.
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Person B, is there any item of yours which I have
entered into this conference which you considered to be
based in emotion rather than factual information? I think
that it is up to people to speak their own emotion, I can
make mistakes.
Come on folks, what's the difference between doing it
and admitting that you're doing it? At least by admitting
that I am doing it I have gained some idea of when I should
not be doing it.
C117 CC233

8/ 9/77

PERSON C

8:21 PM

Actually people the norm you are referring to and that
particular section of the booklet was ghosted by Roxanne
[Hiltz]; however, I agree with it as it stands in the sense
that many new users will not initially realize how easy it
is for a message to get circulated around so I would rather
see the initial emphasis this way to alert people.
C117 CC240

8/10/77

PERSON D

9:11 PM

I think you will find, Person A, that your recent bullying
statements have excluded you from getting any further
messaging of significance from most of the other people in
this conference. That is too bad, since this is the
conference you claim you were given because of your threat
tactics. Pyrrhic victory, I'd say. Good bye until the wind
changes
C117 CC241

8/10/77 10:09 PM

"ALPHA"

I, like Person D, will no longer speak to you, in this
conference, except perhaps, and less frequently, through this
pen name. Somehow, it makes me feel less vulnerable to your
tactics.
C117 CC247

8/11/77

"BETA"

8:41 PM

Hypothesis:
You people are just bored with the range of topics in this
discussion now, and you want to migrate to something new and
different. (Electronic Casanovas??)
Second hypothesis:
Some of you have felt more free to say very negative things
to one another here than you would ever have said face-to-face.
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C117 CC248

8/11/77

PERSON G

8:54 PM

Perhaps Person A's dilemmas were anticipated by Ursula LeGuin
in "The Dispossesed." In that book, it's clear that a
thoroughly anarchistic society is paradoxically highly
dependent upon a very heavy internalization of norms by its
members; otherwise you can't trust them to behave socially
on their own volition. Norms aren't just stifling; they give
predictability.
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APPENDIX D: Identities and Role Definitions in Computerized
Conferencing
By Elaine B. Kerr

We are concerned with the kinds of interpersonal
processes and phenomena that occur in computerized
conferencing which correspond to phenomena in non-electronic
society and which are unique to the electronic mode. The
presence of electronic social forms constitutes the basis of
a sociology of the world of electronic group communications.
We want to probe where and how the electronic medium may
distort or reshape structures, functions, and processes
common to other kinds of social interaction -- like mirrors
in a fun house -- and we want to explore the consequences.
Electronic social relationships are those in which
communications among individuals and groups are electronically
mediated. Human communications are assisted and structured
by a computer. The Electronic Information Exchange System
(EIES) is one such computer-mediated technology from which a
social system has emerged.
Unlike conventional social forms, interaction in
computerized conferencing is not face-to-face, geographically
proximate, or necessarily synchronous. Electronic groups are
theoretically and substantively very different kinds of
emerging social forms, rather than simply extensions or
replications of existing social structures, processes, and
interaction patterns in conventional groups and organizations.
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This paper is intended to contribute to the morphology of
electronic group life by highlighting one practical issue:
the implications of the use of pen names for personal identity
in electronically mediated groups.
Because written communications are substituted for
conventional face-to-face or telephone interaction in
electronic groups, standard non-verbal cues (such as smiles,
frowns, and other body language) are either replaced by
functional equivalents or are unavailable [24]. The pen name
capability in computerized conferencing, as demonstrated in
EIES, may serve either as a cueing feature or as an identity
mask, depending in part on the context and purpose of the
specific interaction. New role definitions, self-images, or
masks can be deliberately donned, tried on for fit, worn on
approval, and exchanged as often as the wearer chooses.
The abscence of non-verbal cues is frequently perceived
by new users of computerized conferencing systems as a
troublesome barrier to effective communication. The pen name
feature, however, can serve in unique ways to partially
counter this and other problems.
The pen name feature acts, in part, to counteract the
tendency of conventional face-to-face meetings to be ruled
by dysfunctional and irrelevant criteria. People are able
to communicate in a computer-mediated meeting without
reference to their physical appearances or auditory
qualities. Ideas and other achieved statuses are relevant to
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the written exchange of ideas, rather than ascriptive
characteristics over which the individual has no control.
One of the many advantages of computer conferences over
face-to-face meetings, which ensues in large part because of
the capability of commenting with a pen name or anonymously,
is the reduction of social inequality as it affects groups
such as minorities, women, and the handicapped, since the
user may elect to mask particular status cues. Equally
important is the ability to disguise cues irrelevant to
professional and scientific dialogue which do exist in
general collegial communications, such as age, race,
beauty, physical size, loudness of voice, body language,
mannerisms, assertiveness, socio-economic status and
organizational position. Users may choose to reveal or hide,
accentuate or ignore, certain personality, social, and
cultural characteristics which would be readily apparent in
communication by other media.
Pen names can hide cues which could distract more than
enhance the quality of group communications, especially when
a group is convened with a mission of scientific inquiry and
communication, rather than simple socializing.
The very nature and quality of the contents of
communication may undergo major alterations as the pen name
assumes over time a unique personality. This personality
may or may not reflect its human source, as the user may or
may not allow abberant or exaggerated dimensions of his or
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her personality to emerge and take shape. Aspects of the
self that one might be reluctant to expose to one's
professional or social peers may be revealed because of the
presence of the pen name option.
Part of the design philosophy of EIES incorporates the
user's ability to send messages or enter conference or
notebook comments in one of three modes chose: with a
signature, a pen name that he or she selects and may change,
or anonymously. The three options, in their message format,
appear as follows:

M 10584

ELAINE KERR (ELAINE,114)

8/ 1/78 7:26 PM L:1

This is the sample text of a message.

M 10585

"JANE ADAMS"

8/ 1/78 7:27 PM L:1

This is the sample text of a message.

M 10586

(ANONYMOUS)

8/ 1/78 7:27 PM L:1

This is the sample text of a message.

Unconventional configurations, not common to other social
forms, are made feasible by the structure of the system.
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The possibilities in the message system look like this:

SENDER
RECEIVER

Pen Name

Name
Normal
Message
System

*

Pen Name

*

*

Anonymous

Planned

Name

future

Anonymous

*
possibilities

Cells noted above by asterisks denote the parameters of
concern. Although it is not now possible to address messages
directly to specified anonymous recipients, this feature is
planned for future implementation, and suggests even more
complex and unknown consequences as anonymous-to-anonymous
interaction becomes possible. Anonymity, or the masking of
identity by the usage of a pen name, is further increased in
any of the cells above except the normal message system, as
a result of the ability of any user to copy an item
received to any other user. In other words, with message
passing, the sender of an unsigned item need not have been
the recipient of the original item being responded to.
Message passing produces anonymous receivers as well as
anonymous senders.
These unique patterns can produce certain kinds of
attitudes and behaviors which otherwise would not likely
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exist. They permit defined lines of thought to be pursued
without the necessity of revealing one's identity or
unmasking the identity of others. In the EIES public
conferences, the receiver of items may choose to remain
anonymous by either non-response or unsigned response; in
private conferences, however, item recipients cannot easily
remain anonymous since conference markers are automatically
updated unless the user deliberately changes his or her
marker.
Pen names on the EIES system are unique. The first
individual to choose one has ownership rights until he or
she elects to change it.
Pen names can also be used for tension-release
purposes to alleviate overwork and ease the strain of late
hours. Yet another function of pen names is to enhance or
raise questions about a user's identity and characteristics.
Pen names can be used to foster the unencumbered
submission of controversial positions in serious on-line
work efforts, although this has not yet been conducted in
anything but an ad hoc way.
The pen name feature has also been used for administrative
reasons, but again for purposes other than those for which it
was originally intended. An administrative use has emerged
with a prefix such as (NOW 112) or (AS 902) to indicate
recent or impending changes of membership identification
numbers. Some users, particularly those who are new, use a
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variation of their proper name as a pen name. This is
probably a result of confusion between the pen name and
the nickname as system identifiers. The phenomenon of
shared names constitutes the third aspect of this kind of
administrative use. An associate or spouse who shares a
membership on the system may use his or her proper name as
a pen name to distinguish communications from those
emanating from the listed member. An institutional name
may be used as a pen name when several people from the same
organization share membership with the listed member. Or a
guest may be listed by his or her proper name as the host's
pen name when on line for demonstration or other temporary
purposes. All together, thirteen such administrative uses of
pen names were found in a sample listing of 185 pen names on
line.
Yet another use of pen names involves masking, deception,
or charades in the attempted violation of the system's
assignment of unique names to its users -- what one person
referred to as "electronic rape." For example, a user under
a pen name identification admitted to establishing
Roxanne (Control D) Hiltz as a pen name, which would appear as:
ROXANNE HILTZ
To deal with this potential deception by clearly distinguishing
pen signatures from real signatures, a design change was
implemented to label pen names in this form:
"JANE ADAMS"
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The pen name and anonymity features are among the
elements of informality deliberately built into the system
to attempt to overcome the impersonality and coldness that
many associate with computers. The design assumption is
that social needs are real, legitimate, and necessary for
task achievement. Features such as pen names promote
informal and less serious exchanges, and in this way can
function as electronic substitutes for the pre-meeting
chatter, coffee breaks, or cocktail hour. Other tensionrelease mechanisms that have emerged on line include informal
conferences, both planned and unplanned on-line "cocktail
parties," and a temporary encounter-type session.
Pen names may serve as a tool for the temporary
redefinition of self. They reflect changing attitudes,
values, and cognitive structures, and permit new kinds of
role-playing and symbolic behavior, especially by
experienced and sophisticated users of the system. (New or
infrequent users are unlikely to be sufficiently familiar
with the system's mechanics to fully explore these kinds of
possibilities.) But the mask may be torn off and the true
identity exposed. One likely consequence is that the pen
name will be changed, and attempts to conceal the new name
may be more strenuous than before.
The masking of identity is more difficult to sustain
with the usage of pen names than by anonymity, since the
pen name can assume a more focused and clear identity over
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time. (For example, in the Encounter Conference, "ALVEY
SINGER" emerged as the trouble-maker, "GERTRUDE MCFUZZ" as
the feminist, and "THE EIES COMPUTER" as the threatening
authoritarian.)
We can make guesses about the author of a pen-named item,
but must realize that, for example, a male might deliberately
choose a female pen name, or vice versa, to avoid
identification. We can make suppositions about the
circumstances under which particular pen names are used, but
must remember that the pen name may stay constant while the
context of its usage changes.
We would like to know the varied effects of pen name
usage on the different audiences addressed. Does receiving a
pen-named item make it more likely that the reader will
respond at all, and that the response will in turn be
signed with a pen name? It would be useful, but is not
possible, to examine the proportion of time in each
conference that members utilized their pen names or one of
the alternates. Does the use of pen names contribute to the
frivolous waste of electronic space, as some might argue, or
does it instead serve as a valid tension-release mechanism?
We do not know, and cannot simply determine, given the
protections for user input built into the system, the
answers to such intriguing questions as:
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o How are pen names chosen?
o What factors influence their choice?
o How frequently are they used?
o In what contexts are they used, discovered, and
changed?
o The characteristics of those who use the pen name
feature compared with those who do not
o How secure users feel using pen names compared with
anonymity
It would be useful to investigate changes in the kinds
of pen names chosen over time. The nature of such trends in
content could clarify the uses to which the pen name
capability is applied. We might be able to note and predict,
for example, that certain kinds of pen names tend to be
chosen by certain kinds of users in specific contexts. The
relatively small time period under review, the likelihood
that only a small proportion of users have yet made full and
frequent use of their pen name capability, and the relatively
small but growing system sophistication of these users,
however, makes this line of inquiry now impossible. (Users
have been questioned as to their pen name habits, but this
request was not made to all users of the system, and not all
who were queried did respond.)
Two listings were constructed on pen names in use on the
EIES system: one yielded 141 names for the almost 400 users
then on line, and the second, culled from a review of three
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conferences, produced 44 additional names. These lists do
not always tell us if the name has ever been used, the
frequency of its use, or its duration. And we cannot, of
course, match pen names with specific users. Although some
of the identifications are known to us, they must remain
confidential. We have on-line access to some but not all of
the communications with pen name signatures.
Of the 185 pen names accumulated, twelve mutually nonexclusive and overlapping categories were discernible.

NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

EXAMPLES

Male

Michael, Masked Man

39

Female

Madame Curie,
Elizabeth

15

Passive or
Meaningless

Me, None

31

Authoritarian,
Expert, or
Assertive

Consultant,
Resource

26

Baron Wed Wabbit,
Chuckles

26

Mythological or
Fantasy

Thor, Merlin

11

Science Fiction
or Space

Spaceman, R2D2

11

Entertainment

Woody Allen, Elvis

10

Literary or
Classical

Christopher Marlowe,
Falstaff

8

Foreign

Bolshoi Brat,
Catherine the Great

6

Humorous
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Computer references

Unknowns and
Problems

The EIES Computer,
The Micro-Code
Maniac

5
37

Janem, Imjed

An analysis of the comparative length of items in two
conferences was performed. The first, Conference 119, was
a private, informal, leaderless, and unstructured conference
entitled "Encounter Session." Twenty-three conferees
produced 230 comments between August 1977 and June 1978.
The second, Conference 1005, is the "Wisdom" public
conference, open to all members of the EIES system. An
unknown, but probably large number of participants, entered
a total of 112 comments since October 1976. This, too', is a
leaderless, informal, and unstructured conference. Compared
with Conference 119, Conference 1005 had fewer themes, and
the topics which did emerge seldom achieved sustained
discussion.
CONFERENCE 119
Total

Length

Signed

Pen Name

Anonymous

1-5 lines

51 (46%)

59 (76%)

35 (74%)

145 (63%)

6-49 lines

59 (54%)

19 (24%)

7 (16%)

85 (37 %)

42 (100%)

230 (100%)

TOTALS

110 (100%)

78 (100%)
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CONFERENCE 1005
Length

Signed

Pen Name

Anonymous

Total

1-5 lines

10 (34%)

26 (65%)

28 (65%)

64 (57%)

6-49 lines

19 (66%)

14 (35%)

15 (35%)

48 (43%)

TOTALS

29 (100%)

40 (100%)

43 (100%)

112 (100%)

Conference 1005 has a higher proportion of unsigned
items than Conference 119, but this is a consequence of the
heavier use of anonymity there. The frequency of pen name
usage is essentially the same in the two conferences.
In Conference 119, although almost half of the entries
are signed, pen names are used almost twice as often as
anonymity. In Conference 1005, the distribution is much more
even.
Both conferences have a preponderance of relatively short
items, which is not surprising in view of their informal
nature. Also in both, the signed items are longer than the
unsigned. This suggests two possibilities: that those going
to the trouble of typing in longer conference comments wish
their efforts to be recognized, or that those choosing to mask
their identities with either pen names or anonymity
deliberately keep their items short in an effort to avoid
detection through use of identifiable syntax or word choice.
Of the shorter items, a higher proportion are signed in
Conference 119 and anonymous in Conference 1005.

-84-

NOTES

1] In addition to CB radio, social observers, of course,
have noted the use of "anonymity" in mob behavior and in
the masking function of the automobile; and the
distressignly disastrous outcomes of such behavior.
2] See Price (1963). One recent paper on a nuclear physics
experiment was co-authored by no less than 79 people.
Some delphi studies and similar structured group
exercises could be said to have been written by
literally hundreds of co-authors. The authors listed for
the published results of such exercises might more
properly be termed editors or facilitators. A recent
publication derived from EIES (Turoff et al. 1978) was
edited by seven people who organized their own
contributions and those of 28 other people who had
contributed to three computerized conferencing groups.
3] Illegal entry to computerized data files and processes is
an omnipresent threat to the privacy, confidentiality and
anonymity functions of all computerized systems. The
subject has been treated extensively elsewhere, and lies
beyond the scope of this report which discusses these
matters mainly in terms of those authorized to use the
computerized conferencing system.
4] By definition it would seem that censorship in a
computerized conferencing system would disallow members to
maintain privacy, confidentiality or anonymity. A
conferencing system could be maintained without these modes
of use and expression, but most of the applications
discussed here could not be obtained.
5] See, for example, Kuhn (1970) and Storer (1966).
6] The sanctity of this relationship was underscored by the
conviction of John Ehrlichman for authorizing the illegal
seizure of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records.
7] A full discussion of the appropriate statutes and regulations
can be found in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Privacy
and Confidentiality (1977).
8] A comprehensive review of results obtained under differing
degrees of confidentiality and anonymity can be found in
Deutscher (1972).
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9] The technique was developed and used by the American
Institute of Public Opinion (the "Gallup Poll"). The
analogy to election anonymity and terminology is so
strongly embedded that to this day Gallup Organization
and other Princeton-based researchers commonly refer
to survey questionnaires as "ballots."
10] This technique most commonly is used in employee
relations surveys to forestall common fears that
management will be able to trace opinions back to
disgruntled employees. The picture of a manager
seeking to determine the identity of the author of a
critical message in the company suggestion box has
been long a favorite of cartoonists.
11] See Warner (1965).
12] A discussion of the most recent cause celebre in this
vein appears in Dickson et al. (1977).
13] Telephone conferencing has been employed only very
rarely in the focus group mode, and to the author's
knowledge has not been evaluated systematically. It
is assumed that a telephone conference focus group
would present considerable mechanical, moderating and
voice-cueing difficulties.
14] Reliable statistics on the comparative incidence of
delphi and focus group surveys are not available, but it
is the author's estimate that in the United States focus
groups probably outnumber delphi studies by a margin of
at least a thousand-to-one.
15] A full discussion of the probable future use of
constraint models in computerized conferencing appears
in Scher (1977).
16] See Kahn (1967) for examples of real conflict situations
and Staff of Strategy & Tactics Magazine (1977) for
exposition of the history and current practices in
conflict simulation gaming.
17] The author has observed that new EIES members typically
enter their credentials in initial directory listings,
but that as they gain experience with the new medium,
credential information gradually is supplanted by
descriptions of topical interests.
18] An interesting summary of current research findings on
the potential biasing effect of personal appearance may
be found in Bennetts (1978).
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19] Even when members use their given names, in those cases
where a name such as Robin is encountered, those not
previously acquainted with the member may not always
know if the member is male or female. Although
evaluative research and experimentation has not been
undertaken on the subject, it would seem, and has been
reported anecdotally, that computerized conferencing
offers women a forum in which sex discrimination is not
encountered to the extent that it may be met in more
conventional environments.
20] In general, cueing anonymity could be of particular
advantage to the physically handicapped or deformed
person. The attention directed towards the handicapped,
real or imagined, could sometimes be as debilitating as
the handicap itself.
21] This discussion of collections is based upon the
specifications developed by Whitescarver and Turoff
(1978).
22] This statement appears in Turoff and Johnson-Lenz
(1977), but was written by S. Roxanne Hiltz.
23] A more complete listing of off-line functions and
associated problems and opportunities appears in
Bezilla (1977).
24] A more thorough discussion of cue-emitting and cuesearching in computerized conferencing will be given
in Kerr and Bezilla (1978).
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